The Intel Itanium architecture uses a dedicated 32-entry hardware 
Introduction
For the past decade, one of the main sources of increased computer system performance has been found in instruction level parallelism (ILP). However, exploiting additional processor resources faces two particular obstacles: control and data dependences. For example, without any form of speculation, execution cannot pass a conditional branch until the branch outcome has been determined, so that it can be difficult to keep all the functional units of the processor busy. To overcome the limitations on ILP imposed by control dependences, various forms of control speculation in the compiler and processor have been conceived. For example, computer architects have added speculative load instructions to the instruction set architecture (ISA) to enable the compiler to schedule a load before a conditional branch without chang- (a) before data speculation (b) after data speculation Figure 1 . Data speculation example. The load into register r6 and the dependent load instruction are speculatively executed before the possibly aliased store. Before the loaded value is used, a special check instruction is used that branches to recovery code to redo the load and add in case the store wrote the same memory location.
ing program semantics. Moreover, control speculation in the form of speculative execution (i.e., via speculation hardware, such as branch predictors) is performed by nearly all high performance processors today. To overcome limitations imposed by data dependences, several data speculation approaches have been developed recently [14, 11, 5, 6] .
In data speculation, a computation is performed speculatively based on the value of some data item (e.g., a variable), that is not yet available. In particular, a memory load and dependent computations may be executed before a possibly aliased store. Consider the example in Figure 1 . The original code performs a store, then loads a value from memory, uses the value to perform an addition, and finally stores the result back to memory. A data dependence between the first store and the subsequent load must be assumed unless the store and load are known to definitely access different memory locations. Therefore, the load instruction cannot be hoisted above the store to (1) hide the load latency, and (2) make use of possibly available machine resources before the store Data speculation works by breaking this data dependence and speculatively performing the load and dependent computations. In the example, which shows Intel Itanium assembly code, a load of one operand of an add instruction is hoisted above a possibly aliased store using a special dataspeculatively load instruction, called an advanced load. After the store, a special check instruction (chk.a) is used to determine if misspeculation occurred: if the store modified the same memory location accessed by the load, the check instruction branches to recovery code. The compilergenerated recovery code repeats the load and the add instruction and then branches back to resume normal execution.
To detect misspeculation, the Intel Itanium processor [3] uses a dedicated hardware structure, the Advanced Load Address Table ( ALAT), a 32-entry fully-associative table that holds the addresses of data speculative loads (like the ld8.a in the example) and their target registers. Every store instruction clears a matching entry from the ALAT, i.e., store instructions to the address of a previous data-speculative (or advanced) load will remove that advanced load's entry. The chk.a detects misspeculation by doing a lookup in the ALAT using the target register of the load. If no matching entry is found, a store must have occurred to the same address as the speculative load and recovery becomes necessary.
For this paper, we performed an empirical study to determine how well current state-of-the art optimizing compilers do in using the data speculation instructions provided by the Itanium architecture. In particular, we measured how often data-speculative instructions are generated, and how they exercise the ALAT table. We wanted to find out how frequent data speculative instructions typically fail during execution and whether capacity misses occur often in practice. Since our study is empirical and based on actual compilers, we also wanted to find out whether current compiler technology is able to make beneficial use of the hardware features provided by Itanium. Specifically, this paper makes the following contributions:
• we empirically evaluate how often state of the art compilers exploit data speculation for SPEC CPU2000 benchmarks by examining their use of data speculation instructions;
• we use hardware performance counters to measure the frequency of misspeculation, and how often misspeculation is due to capacity misses in the ALAT table;
• we performed a limit study for the potential of data speculation by modifying the heuristics used in the Open Research Compiler to always generate data speculation when feasible; the modified aggressive data speculation frequently resulted in improved performance;
• and finally, we demonstrate that generally, current compilers are too conservative in the application of data speculation on the Itanium, which indicates that better speculation heuristics may be possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the data speculation support provided by the Intel Itanium architecture. Section 3 describes our experimental setup and the programs we used. Section 4 describes the results we obtained; Section 5 discusses related work, and finally Section 6 concludes.
Data Speculation on the Intel Itanium Processor
The Intel Itanium processor provides several instructions to enable data speculation by the compiler. First, both integer and floating point load instructions of different sizes are available in the form of advanced loads. In addition to loading the type of value indicated, they also allocate an entry in a special hardware table, the Advanced Load Address Table (ALAT). For that purpose, a register tag based on the physical target register of the load is computed and stored along with the size of the load, and a tag derived from the physical memory address accessed by the load instruction. If there's already an entry with the same register tag in the ALAT, that entry is removed first.
The intended use of an advanced load instruction is for it to be performed before a possibly aliased (and therefore data-dependent) store instruction, thereby speculatively breaking a potential data dependence. Therefore, a data-speculative sequence of instructions consists of an advanced load, and possibly some instructions that are dependent on the value of that load. In addition, to ensure correctness, the speculative sequence must be concluded by some form of a check instruction that detects misspeculation, and code to recover from misspeculation.
The Itanium processor provides two forms of check instructions: a load check instruction ld.c and a more general check and recover instruction chk.a. The first form reloads the value if the register tag of the target register is not found in the ALAT, i.e., it performs checking and recovery in one instruction. It is useful if only the load itself was speculative and no instructions dependent on the loaded value were performed. In the latter case, the chk.a instruction must be used that branches to recovery code if no entry matching the register tag of the indicated check register is found in the ALAT. The recovery code must reload and recompute any speculatively performed operations and will then typically jump back to resume execution right after the check instruction (as shown in the example in Figure 1 ). Table 1 lists the full set of data speculation instructions provided by the Itanium architecture. ld.a, ldf.a, and ldfp.a are advanced load instructions of integers, floating point values, and pair of floating point values. They load the value and allocate an entry in the ALAT with the register tag of the target destination register. 1 The Itanium allows the combination of data and control speculation and provides ld.sa, ldf.sa, and ldfp.sa for that purpose. In addition to allocating an entry in the ALAT, they also generate an exception token [16] that is used to generate an exception once it is determined that the instruction is definitely executed.
The load check instructions are provided in two basic forms: those that clear the ALAT entry after the check (indicated by the .clr suffix in the instruction mnemonic). The compiler will use this version if there is no further use of the ALAT entry. Deallocating the ALAT entry decreases the likelihood that a still useful entry may be replaced when the ALAT becomes full. In the .nc variant, the ALAT entry is not cleared and can therefore be checked again. This is particularly useful in loops. The compiler may specula-tively identify a load instruction as loop invariant and hoist it before the loop. In the loop, a load check instruction can then be used to ensure a correct value in the target register if the load turns out not to be loop invariant. Similar to the load check instructions, the chk.a instruction also comes in to flavors, one preserving (.nc) and one deleting the ALAT entry (.clr). Finally, the instructions invala and invala.e, where e denotes a general purpose or floating point register invalidate all or a specific ALAT entry (the one with the matching register tag). This is useful for explicit management of ALAT contents. For example, the operating system uses invala to clear the ALAT table upon context switches.
Experimental Setup and Workload
To determine how current optimizing compilers for the Itanium architecture use its data speculation instructions and hardware, we used the SPEC CPU2000 [15] benchmarks, which are commonly used to evaluate CPU and compiler performance. Since only C and C++ benchmarks (the majority of the suite) can be compiled by all the compilers we used, we performed our experiments only for them. gcc and art were excluded because for them, some compiler configurations (e.g., when using interprocedural optimiza-tion) produced incorrect code.
Experimental Procedure
We produced the program binaries for the different configurations and computed static counts of the data speculative instructions by counting how many advanced load, load check, and check instructions were generated in each case (cf. Table 3 ). To characterize the dynamic data speculation behavior and use of the ALAT, we used the perfmon tool [13] , version 2.0 for Linux kernel version 2.4. Perfmon uses the Itanium's hardware performance monitoring counters to obtain information about dynamic program performance. Specifically, we used it to count the following events:
• the total number of ld.c or chk.a check instructions that were performed (i.e., the INST CHKA LDC ALAT ALL counter);
• the number of those check instructions that failed (i.e., the INST FAILED CHKA LDC ALAT ALL counter); and finally,
• the number of ALAT capacity miss events that occurred, counted as the number of times a new ALAT entry replaced a still active one (i.e., the ALAT CAPACITY MISS ALL counter). 2 We compiled and ran the program on an otherwise unloaded Hewlett Packard ZX6000 workstation, with two 1.3 GHz Itanium 2 processors, 1 GB or RAM, running Redhat Linux 7.2 (Advanced Workstation Edition). The program were run 20 times and we computed 95% confidence intervals shown as error bars in the graphs in Section 4. For the execution time results in Figure 2 , we ran the benchmarks only ten times to save time (but still computed 95% confidence intervals). Table 2 lists the programs that we used to conduct our experiments. The programs range from about 1,000 lines of code to approximately 60,000 lines of code and cover a wide range of tasks. For our experiments, we ran the benchmarks on their SPEC-supplied reference inputs. Some benchmarks process multiple input files as part of their reference runs. Since the different inputs sometimes revealed different (run-time) data speculation characteristics, the figures in Section 4 indicate on which inputs the respective benchmarks were run. For example, bzip2 program indicates that the application bzip2 was run on input program.
Programs

Compilers
We used three compilers to conduct our experiments, GNU gcc version 3.4.2, version 2.1 of the Open Research Compiler (ORC) [12] , and Intel's commercial ecc compiler, version 7.1. We compiled the applications in two configurations. The first used the highest optimization levels (-O3) but no feedback-directed optimization. The second configuration produced an executable based on profile information by first compiling the programs, then running them on the SPEC-provided training (train) inputs, and then compiling them using the profile information obtained during this profile run. In our graphs in Section 4, ECC refers to the configuration without feedback information and ECC FDO to the configuration with feedback-based optimization (and analogously for ORC). In all cases, we performed interprocedural optimization using the -ipa switch for the ORC compiler, and the -ipo switch for the ecc compiler.
Limit Study
To determine whether more aggressive generation of data-speculative instructions would exercise the ALAT structure more aggressively, and to determine whether there is room for better data speculation heuristics, we also modified ORC in several places to force it to generate dataspeculative instructions whenever possible without compromising program correctness.
Specifically, we modified ORC's heuristic in the following ways:
1. ORC uses a control variable cutting set size to decide whether to generate data speculation in some cases. This variable is equal to one more than the number of compensation (basic) blocks that are required to compensate for the effects of mispeculation. We commented out the comparison with this variable in the scheduler (which handles the conversion of normal to data-speculative loads) to force the generation of data speculation regardless of the number of compensation blocks required.
2. Dependences between stores and loads that are not definite, i.e., that are not guaranteed to access the same memory are normally treated as "relaxed" dependences, which makes them eligible for data speculation. For instance, a store through a pointer followed by a load through another pointer will typically create an indefinite dependence (unless the static alias analysis is able to rule out any possibility of accessing the same memory). Even though they are indefinite, some edges are normally treated as unrelaxed edges by ORC, for instance, when the scheduling heuristic indicates that the earliest time the dependent load can be scheduled is later than the latest time it can be scheduled without making the schedule longer. We modified the code to always treat indefinite dependences as relaxed dependences to force data speculation for them.
3. Finally, ORC uses a profitability heuristic to assess whether data speculation might be profitable. This heuristic, for instance, limits the number of data dependences that a speculative load is allowed to violate, and speculation is not performed beyond that maximum. We changed the profitability heuristic to always return true, i.e., assume data speculation is always profitable when the profitability heuristic is consulted.
Results
In our experiments we found that gcc is currently unable to exploit the data speculation features of the Itanium processor and never generates any data-speculative features. For none of the benchmarks, gcc generated any data-speculative instructions. We checked the GNU website (http://www.gnu.org/), which revealed that the previously developed support for data speculation had been found to be too immature to be integrated into the gcc release. The discussion in the subsequent sections therefore discusses only the results for the other compilers. Table 3 shows the static number of advanced load, load check and and general check (chk.a) instructions that were generated for the compilers used in our study in their different configurations. Based on the static count of dataspeculative instructions generated, it appears that ORC is usually more aggressive when it comes to data speculation. Based on the number of advanced load instructions, in 8 out of the 12 applications ORC generates a higher number of speculative instructions than ecc; in some cases, a considerably higher number. For instance, for vpr 160 compared to 9, and for twolf 765 instead of 53. When FDO is used, ecc is even more careful and now for all applications ORC equake  12  0  14  9  9  20  9  9  20  mcf  37  6  36  33  13  28  53  19  41  bzip2  30  0  30  41  12  67  143  79  115  gzip  0  0  0  1  15  53  197  54  114  parser  233  100  120  414  46  271  1196  374  712  ammp  39  8  38  138  40  127  503  202  355  vpr  9  3  6  160  86  142  370  159  290  crafty  38  26  12  201  54  204  578  210  454  twolf  53  24  31  765  166  611  1511  475  1133  mesa  1767  577  1324  1975  545  1582  3369  1212  2471  gap  3334  1153  2096  1323  270  922  4398  1413 Table 3 . This table shows the number of data-speculative instructions generated for the different compilers and configurations. ecc and orc refer to the Intel and Open Research Compiler, respectively; eccfdo and orcfdo when these compilers were used with feedback-directed optimization; orcM and orcfdoM is ORC modified to generate data speculation whenever possible, i.e., with the modifications described in Section 3.4.
Static Data Speculation Results
generates more advanced loads than ecc. ecc seems to be particularly careful to avoid failed data speculation and the associated performance penalty.
Turning on feedback-directed optimization in ORC, decreases speculation in about half of the cases and increases it for the other half. For instance, for ammp, instead of 138 only 102 advanced loads are generated but for gzip 27 instead of one are generated. For ORC, we also looked at the overall performance impact resulting from using FDO. Figure 2 shows the relative execution time of the different ORC configurations that we used, with the unmodified ORC execution time (without FDO) normalized to one. The second bar for each application shows the relative execution time of ORC with FDO (without our modifications). As can be seen in the graph, except for twolf the programs perform better with ORC when FDO is used; twolf slows down by somewhat under 20%. Whether the slowdown is due to the less aggressive data speculation (594 versus 765 advanced load) instructions, is not clear, although Figure 3 seems to suggest that this is not the case as the fraction of failed checks at run time is roughly the same. Furthermore, when data speculation became more aggressive, it seems that it usually improved performance, or (since other factors may be contributing) at least did not have a significant negative impact, since the percentage of failed speculation did not change between ORC and ORC with FDO (cf. Figure 3 ). Table 3 also shows the effect of the modifications to ORC that we made. For all applications, the generation of data speculation whenever possible, increases the number of data-speculative instructions. Figure 4 shows the effect of our changes graphically. With the sole exception of equake, data speculation increased significantly, for gzip by more than five times. As we'll see below, this improved performance for some inputs (over 10% when compressing a program), but slowed down performance for others (e.g., a slowdown of about 5% for compressing a log file). 
Dynamic Data Speculation Results
Results for the ecc Compiler
The dynamic performance counter data confirms that the ecc compiler appears to be generally quite careful when generating data speculation, in particular, when no profile information is used. Figure 5 shows that the misspeculation rate for ecc without FDO is generally below 0.5%, and only for vortex somewhat over 1%. The misspeculations go up when FDO is used, i.e., ecc is then more aggressive. Generally, this did not have a negative impact on overall performance. Figure 6 shows how often entries in the ALAT were replaced by new entries because it was full as a fraction of the total number of data speculation checks performed. Only for the floating point applications equake and mesa we did see a significant number of them; for the former only when FDO was used.
Results for the ORC Compiler
Compared to the ecc compiler, ORC in general is more aggressive in the use of data speculation. crafty, stands out with over 16% of misspeculation as shown in Figure 3 . mcf, bzip2, parser, and ammp are other applications that show at least about 1% misspeculation, whereas the other applications show almost no misspeculation. Together with vpr (for the place input), crafty shows ALAT capacity misses. However, compared to the total number of ALAT checks, those still account for only 0.1% (691,000 capacity misses versus 542,350,000 executed check instructions). They are further reduced when FDO is used, which indicates that ORC is able to take advantage of profile information to apply speculation more judiciously.
Results for the Limit Study
As discussed in Section 4.1, the modified version of ORC that generates data speculation as much as possible, produces code with a significantly higher (static) number of data-speculative instructions (up to five times as many as shown in Figure 4 . This is also reflected in the number of advanced load checks that are executed at run time, shown in Figure 7 . We see a drastic increase in the total number of load check instructions that are executed compared to the original version of ORC, regardless whether FDO is used or not. Interestingly, however, the number of misspeculations does not go up proportionally. In fact, for almost all applications the misspeculation ratio goes down considerably (cf. Figure 3) .
Often, this also results in reduced execution time, as shown in Figure 2 . Application gzip ran about 10% faster (on one input), vpr and crafty showed some small improvements, as did gap and mesa. For the others, the additional speculation did not result in any noticeable performance changes. Only gzip showed some slowdowns, but not on all inputs: compressing a program and source code ran faster, whereas compressing the other inputs ran slower but only by a few percent.
This indicates that the currently used heuristic to generate data speculation can be improved and even though it is already more aggressive than the one used by the ecc compiler, being more aggressive still can further improve execution times. The number of capacity miss events seems to support this: while the fraction of capacity miss events goes up significantly, in general it seems to be not stressing the ALAT excessively (cf. Figure 8 ). However, it would be interesting to study the effects on overall performance with a larger ALAT table so that misspeculation due to capacity problems would be eliminated.
Related Work
Many researchers have studied data speculation and how it can be used to improve ILP and performance in general [14, 11, 5, 6, 17, 18, 10, 4, 1] . Zhai et al. [17, 18] have looked at data speculation to enable aggressive thread-level speculation. They schedule past data dependences, which is similar to the use of advanced load and check instruction on the Itanium processor. However, their recovery mechanism is based on rollback (rewind) of execution to the point before the data dependence violation occurred.
August et al. [1] evaluate a hardware structure, the memory conflict buffer, which could be seen as a precursor of the ALAT. Like the ALAT, it is used to support data-speculative instructions. It is evaluated on a synthetic architecture based on the HP PA-7100 processor and shown to achieve modest performance gains. The paper does not give details on how many data speculation instructions were generated and how much the memory conflict buffer was exercised by them.
Gonzáles and Gonzáles [4, 5] were one of the first to study the possible ILP gains resulting from data speculation. In [4] they specifically look at predicting a load address and speculatively performing the load and any data dependent instructions. In their experiments, they found performance gains of up to 35% resulting from this approach. In their follow-up work [5] , they evaluate specific value predictors for their performance potential in supporting this style of program optimization. This work was later extended to multithreaded architectures [10] .
Lin et al. [9, 7, 8] , use the Itanium's data speculations support to perform more general speculative optimizations. In particular, they extend Chow et al.'s extension of static single assignment form (called HSSA [2] ) to incorporate speculative alias information obtained by alias profiling. This allows their compiler (an extension of ORC) to speculatively perform partial redundancy elimination, possibly eliminating redundancies that are only redundant if certain memory operations are not aliased. Through a creative use of advanced load, load check and check instructions, their approach ensures the correctness of speculatively optimized code even when the alias relationships during actual program execution differ from the profiled alias relationships. As a result, their compiler tends to make more aggressive use of the data speculation instructions than the compilers examined in this study.
Conclusions and Future Work
In our evaluation of data speculation use by current state of the art compilers for the Intel Itanium architecture, we found that generally, compilers appear to be quite conservative and almost never oversubscribe the ALAT by performing too much speculation. Our modifications to ORC's dataspeculation heuristic that generates data speculation whenever possible, resulted in much higher data speculation and frequently improved performance (of up to 10%) and negatively impacted performance only for one application (for some inputs). In the future, we would like to find a practical heuristic that approaches the performance of the "always speculate" modification but avoids over-speculation as much as possible.
